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 Political Influence and Financial Flexibility: Evidence from China 
 
Abstract 
This paper investigates how political influence affects firms’ financial flexibility and speed 
of adjustment toward target leverage ratios. We find that at the macro level, firms in 
environments with high political advantages, proxied by provincial affiliations with heads 
of state as well as political status and party rank of provincial leaders, adjust faster. At the 
micro level, firms that are state-owned, have CPC members as executives, or bear low 
exposure to changes in political uncertainty adjust faster. When interacted, the micro-level 
political factors have more significant impact.  
JEL: G30, G32, P16 
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1. Introduction 
Political influence and economy are inseparable, and in the modern world, political 
influence has become increasingly powerful in determining economic outcomes. A large 
body of recent work studies such impact (Bloom, Bond, and Van Reenen, 2007; Alesina, 
1987; Alesina and Roubini, 1992; and Pastor and Veronesi, 2013; among others) and finds 
that political influence, including macro-level political environment and micro-level firm-
specific political connections, significantly affects firms’ decision-making and their overall 
performance.  
The main macro-level political impact comes from alternating political power and 
changes in regulations and policies. Presidential elections are one example.1 Prior to an 
election, firms operate under the possibility that certain unforeseeable political situations 
may result in erroneous decision-making and deteriorating performance. After an election, 
subsequent changes in regulation, as well as in fiscal, monetary, and foreign policy 
continue to exert long-term influence on firms’ decision-making.2 Such shifts in policies 
may directly affect how firms make investment decisions (Julio and Yook, 2012 and 2016), 
how they receive and raise capital, and how much they pay for capital (Houston, Jiang, 
Lin, and Ma, 2014; Colak, Durnev, and Qian, 2017).   
At the micro-level, political connections play a bigger role in firms’ daily operations. 
Firms make political investments in the form of political contributions, lobbying, and 
 
1 A sizable number of studies (e.g., Santa-Clara and Valkanov 2003; Julio and Yook, 2012, 2016; Colak, 
Gungoraydinoglu, and Öztekin, 2017; Gungoraydinoglu, Colak, and Oztekin, 2017) examine political 
influence at the state level using presidential elections as the major source of political uncertainty and political 
risk. Jens (2017), Colak, Durnev, and Qian (2017) and Gao and Qi (2013) use U.S. gubernatorial elections 
as a proxy for political uncertainty.  
2 In terms of policy-making, a ruling party may hold very different views from those of the opposition party, 
leading to discernible business cycles in certain industries, geographic areas, and business groups. The impact 
can be profound and prominent in certain industries, as well as in countries with less developed legal and 
political systems. For example, Hong and Kostovetsky (2012) show that in the United States, Democrats are 
more apt to support environmental and labor causes and oppose smoking, guns, and defense. Belo, Gala, and 
Li (2013) support this; their study shows that industries with high government exposure experience higher 
cash flows and stock returns during Democratic presidencies, but the opposite pattern holds during 
Republican presidencies. Researchers also document that firms facing such uncontrollable forces of 
uncertainty may postpone projects and financing decisions (Bernanke, 1983; Bloom, Bond, and Van Reenen, 
2007; Colak and Gunay, 2011), cut investment (Julio and Yook, 2012 and 2016), and incur higher financing 
costs (Houston, Jiang, Lin, and Ma, 2014; Drobetz, El Ghoul, Guedhami and Janzen, 2018 and Colak, 
Durnev, and Qian, 2017). 
3 
 
offering advisory positions, in particular.3 Such activities certainly “grease the skids” as 
far as preferable treatment is concerned. For example, firms with stronger political 
connections receive more government investment (Duchin and Sosyura, 2012; Cohen, 
Coval, and Malloy, 2011; and Goldman, Rocholl, and So, 2009), are more likely to be 
bailed out in a financial crisis (Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell, 2006), and are less likely 
to be charged with fraud (Yu and Yu, 2011). These firms also tend to demonstrate better 
performance (Faccio, 2006; and Cooper, Gulen, and Ovtchinnikov, 2010). One stream of 
research in this area examines capital-structure decisions (Cao, Duan, and Uysal, 2013), 
and the cost of capital (Qi, Roth, and Wald, 2010; Gao and Qi, 2013; Francis, Hasan, and 
Zhu, 2014; Anginer, Demirgüc-Kunt and Mare, 2018, Waisman, Ye, and Zhu, 2015). 
However, it remains unclear how political influence affects a firm’s collective decision-
making regarding its optimal capital structure. It is thus natural to investigate how macro-
level and micro-level political influence affects a firm’s capital-structure decisions and 
financial flexibility. 
How firms determine their capital structures is one of the most fundamental and classic 
questions in corporate finance. Although a firm’s capital structure does not yield 
perceivable benefits under the classic Modigliani-Miller theorem, a number of arguments, 
such as trade-off, pecking order, and market-timing theories, point to the impact of capital 
structure on firm-level decision making and consequently on firm performance and value. 
More specifically, what type of capital to raise, when, and at what cost are all relevant, 
central questions.  
A critical question remains, however, regarding how firms maintain their financial 
flexibility and adjust their capital structures under political influence. According to the 
well-circulated Graham and Harvey (2001), a majority of firms manage their capital 
structures around target leverage ratios. A number of empirical studies (e.g., Hovakimian, 
Hovakimian, Tehranian, 2004; Baker and Wurgler, 2002; Flannery and Rangan, 2006; 
Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender, 2008) work around this assumption, providing evidence 
that firms maintain relatively stable capital structures and actively manage them toward 
 
3 For example, Google spent $16,830,000 on lobbying in 2014, part of which was in the form of political 
donations to 162 members of the U.S. Congress in the latest election cycle. (opensecrets.org) 
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target leverage ratios. Firms vary in their endeavors and ability to adjust, and they wait for 
good opportunities to make cost-efficient adjustments (Baker and Wurgler, 2002; Leary 
and Roberts, 2005).  An empirical approach to identifying financial flexibility is to quantify 
a firm’s speed of adjustment (SOA) toward a long-term target leverage ratio. A higher SOA 
indicates the firm is converging on the targeted leverage ratio faster and thus is more 
financially flexible. This facilitates other firm-level decision-making and contributes to 
firm value and performance.  
Connecting with the aforementioned evidence that political factors affect a firm’s cost 
of capital, government investment and purchases, detection of financial fraud, and other 
factors, it is unclear what collective impact these mechanisms, directly or indirectly, have 
on capital-structure decisions and financial flexibility. This paper fills that gap and 
examines political influence on speed of adjustment.  
We conduct the empirical analysis using political data from China. This choice offers 
several advantages. First, China is politically oriented, politically corrupt, and bureaucratic 
(see, e.g., Allen, Qian, and Qian, 2005; Fan, Wong, and Zhang, 2007; Li and Zhou, 2005). 
Undeniably, political influence pervades every aspect of the fast-changing society, and a 
political way of thinking is embedded in almost all major firm-level decisions, especially 
for public firms. In addition, a sizeable number of public firms are state-controlled, making 
it easier to track and quantify state interest and influences. Second, information about firm-
level political connections is readily available for publicly listed firms in China. In the 
United States and European countries, political contributions only implicitly capture such 
political connections, social network connections, and other inferred channels. Third, in 
China, a typical public firm’s capital structure is relatively simple, with major external 
financing from short-term bank loans, as opposed to long-term corporate bond and seasonal 
equity offerings in the United States. This simplifies the empirical challenge of our 
investigation and makes it easier for firms to adjust their capital structures quickly. Last, 
China’s single-party political structure eases the quantification of political influence, as 
well as lessens concerns of bipartisan government control and politically induced business 
cycles (e.g., Allen, Qian, Shan, and Zhao, 2014).  
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We employ two sets of measurements for political influence. At the macro level, we 
examine the affiliations between provincial leaders and heads of state, the power status of 
the incumbered provincial leaders and the degree of political pluralism within the province. 
At the micro level, we first adopt measures of firm-level political connections and state 
ownership. Then we create a firm-level time-variant measure of exposure to political 
environment using the Political Uncertainty Index from Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2012).  
At both levels, we find consistent results that political factors positively affect firms’ 
speed of adjustment. For example, in provinces where leaders possess greater political 
power, firms’ SOA is 48% higher than in other provinces.4 Firms with better connections 
to the Communist Party of China (CPC) also have higher SOA than those with weaker 
political connections. Although political connection may be exogenous to firm-level 
capital-structure decisions, we strengthen the causal link by employing China’s provincial 
emigration policy as an exogenous shock. The results remain robust and economically 
unchanged.   
By documenting that stronger political environments and political connections enhance 
a firm’s financial flexibility, this paper makes a number of contributions to the literature. 
First, it is the first to conduct a comprehensive investigation of how political influence 
affects firms’ financial flexibility given a variety of political factors at macro and micro 
levels. The dual-level approach not only unveils a more complete picture of political 
influence, but also deepens our understanding of the joint impact of political environment 
and political connection. The finding that micro-level political connections are more 
important than macro-level political environment in affecting financial flexibility sets this 
paper apart from extant works, including Colak, Gungoraydinoglu, and Öztekin (2017), 
which looks at the impact of country-level political uncertainty on firm leverage and capital 
structure.  
Second, because capital structure constitutes the foundation of the modern corporation 
and affects almost all firm-level decision-making, this paper builds solid ground for future 
 
4 If a provincial leader becomes a member of the Politburo, the SOA during his/her regime is 28.0%, 
compared with an SOA of 18.9% if the province leader was not promoted to such an elite level.  
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studies to explain political influence in other firm-level decisions, as well as the impact of 
the political environment on various stakeholders.   
Third, this paper joins the ongoing debate about whether political connections and 
affiliations are important factors in firm operation. We unveil the importance of political 
connections in firm capital-structure outcomes. The finding that significant changes in firm 
political positions lead to changes in firm financial flexibility also reinforces the 
importance of corporate investment in acquiring political connections.  
Fourth, by setting our empirical investigation in China, we deliver extra insights into 
the role of the external political structure in a transitioning economy. Our conclusion, 
however, may not be limited to the realm of emerging economies. In well-developed 
countries with fully fledged legal systems, the soft power of political influence plays an 
equally substantial role in firm operation. A majority of the literature motivating this paper 
uses data in the United States and developing countries. Thus, the underlying mechanisms, 
though perhaps amplified in China, are well documented in developing countries. 5 
Therefore, it is very likely that political influence has similar effects on SOA in developed 
countries. This paper may motivate studies in countries with various constitutional 
structures, legal systems, and fiscal and monetary policies.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the underlying 
mechanisms of the link between political influence and financial flexibility and builds 
testable hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and the methodology we adopt to measure 
SOA and key political factors. Section 4 presents the main results and discusses their 
implications. We employ robustness checks and additional analysis in section 5, and 
section 6 concludes.  
2. Underlying Mechanisms and Hypothesis-Building 
As discussed, political factors have a direct and profound influence on economic outcomes, 
financial markets, and firm-level decision-making. This includes decisions to raise capital, 
 
5 Though the financial market structure varies across countries, the supply of external capital rather than the 
forms of capital should affect the impact of political factors on firms’ willingness to adjust their target 
leverage ratios.  
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when and how to do so, and at what cost. These issues collectively and directly affect firms’ 
capital structures and financial flexibility. In this section, we discuss the underlying 
mechanisms and build the hypotheses.  
At the macro level, it is well documented that political turbulence increases the cost of 
capital and encourages firms to postpone investment decisions. For example, Cao, Duan, 
and Uysal (2003) show that firms tend to reduce leverage, remain underleveraged for 
extended periods, and wait longer to issue debt during periods of high political uncertainty. 
Waisman, Ye, and Zhu (2015) find that uncertainty associated with the outcome of U.S. 
presidential elections leads to a 34-basis-point increase in corporate bond spreads, with 
closer campaign years associated with additional costs. Similarly, Francis, Hasan, and Zhu 
(2014) show that fluctuations in the political environment impose additional costs on 
private loan contracts. Gao and Qi (2013) find that in both the primary and secondary 
markets, municipal bond yields increase sharply by six to eight basis points before 
gubernatorial elections and then reverse afterward. In a cross-country study, Qi, Roth, and 
Wald (2010) show that a one-standard-deviation increase in political rights is associated 
with an 18.6% decline in bond spreads. Furthermore, Julio and Yook (2012, 2016) find that 
political uncertainty around presidential elections impedes firm-level investment. Also, 
Cohen, Coval, and Malloy (2011) use changes in congressional committee chairmanships 
to show that fiscal spending shocks significantly dampen firm-level investment activity.  
At the micro level, political connections affect various kinds of capital-related 
decisions. For instance, Duchin and Sosyura (2012) find that politically connected firms 
are more likely to be funded, though investments in these firms underperform those of 
unconnected firms. Goldman, Rocholl, and So (2009) document abnormal stock returns 
following the announcements of nominations of politically connected individuals to boards.  
In addition, political connections can expose firms to more favorable policies that shield 
them from regulatory compliance and legal issues. For example, using government bailouts 
of 450 politically connected firms from 35 countries during 1997–2002, Faccio, Masulis, 
and McConnell (2006) show that politically connected firms are significantly more likely 
to be bailed out than similar, nonconnected firms. Yu and Yu (2011) links firms’ lobbying 
activities with fraud detection and finds that, compared to nonlobbying firms, firms that 
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lobby have significantly lower chances of being accused of fraud, evade fraud detection 
117 days longer, and are 38% less likely to be penalized by regulators. 
Despite rich evidence that the macro-level political environment and micro-level 
political connections affect capital-related decision-making, it is unclear what collective 
effect these mechanisms have on SOA. We argue that political influence may affect SOA 
in both positive and negative ways.  
On one hand, political advantages may raise the speed of adjustment. As mentioned, at 
the micro level, political connections facilitate access to external financing, lower the cost 
of capital, infuse firms with more government expenditures and investment, and during 
extreme financial constraint provide funding and bail-outs (Faccio, Masulis, and 
McConnell, 2006; Yu and Yu, 2011; Duchin and Sosyura, 2012; Goldman, Rocholl, and 
So, 2009). At the macro level, certain political environments may nurture firms. For 
example, when firms are located in areas where top political leaders rank high within the 
power structure or have stronger ties to top-level political leaders (Qi, Roth, and Wald, 
2010; Cohen, Coval, and Malloy, 2011), they have better access financial markets, 
government expenditures, preferable tax treatments, and other advantages that eventually 
lead to higher SOA.  
On the other hand, the same political advantages may lower the speed of adjustment. 
First and foremost, a firm with more political advantages enjoys lower legal risk (Agrawal 
and Knoeber, 2001; Yu and Yu, 2011). It is less likely to be involved in fraud, has more 
flexibility in accounting transparency (Yu and Yu, 2011; Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee, 2006), 
has stronger contacts with banks (Chen, Shen and Lin 2014), and receives superior 
government protections. Thus, the firm does not have to monitor its financial flexibility 
closely, because it can easily raise additional capital at a desirable cost if its political 
connections are “in the pocket.”   
Second, it is not uncommon that executives lack the financial knowledge to make 
optimal financial decisions. In the United States, for example, many public pension fund 
managers are more like politicians than financial experts. Their actions may be motivated 
more by political or social influences than by firm performance, which comes at the 
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expense of taxpayers and pension beneficiaries (Woidtke, 2002). Politically induced local 
bias also hampers value maximization (Bradley, Pantzalis, and Yuan, 2016). In developing 
countries, including China, executives in firms with strong political status may also lack 
the financial knowledge to optimize firms’ capital structures. Some firms, especially those 
controlled by the state, are run by politicians or managers pursuing political careers. Their 
goals may deviate from optimizing capital structure in the interest of shareholders.  
Third, a capital-structure decision may not be of first-order importance for state-related 
controlling shareholders with strong political agendas in areas where local political leaders 
prioritize politics over economic outcomes. The underlying logic is that sacrifices for 
political consideration are rewarded in other ways or are the result of extracting rent. For 
example, Hung, Wong & Zhang (2012) point out that political consideration is more 
important than performance among Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) listed 
overseas. In the context of capital structure adjustment, for instance, political connections 
may motivate firms to borrow excessively as a favor to help fulfill local banks’ lending 
targets in order to maintain connections with local politicians.  
Of the three mechanisms, micro-level political connections drive the second and third; 
the first mechanism relates to both the macro- and micro-level factors, as legal protection 
comes from both local politicians and specific, firm-level political connections. 
Based on these two counterarguments, we build competing hypotheses: the aptitude 
hypothesis and the audacity hypothesis. The aptitude hypothesis theorizes that political 
advantages make it easier for firms to adjust their financial leverage and result in higher 
speed of adjustment. The audacity hypothesis theorizes that political advantages shelter 
firms from legal consequences so that deviation from target leverage ratios is not a primary 
concern, leading to lower speed of adjustment. In both cases, the impact may take place at 
both macro and micro levels. We formulate the two hypotheses as follows: 
Aptitude Hypotheses: 
H1a: Firms in environments with strong political advantages have high speed of 
adjustment.  
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H2a: Firms with strong political connections have high speed of adjustment.  
Audacity Hypotheses: 
H1b: Firms in environments with strong political advantages have low speed of 
adjustment.  
H2b: Firms with strong political connections have low speed of adjustment.  
It is worth noting that the two hypotheses are not mutually exclusive. That is, the 
underlying mechanisms may influence a firm’s ability and willingness to adjust its target 
leverage ratio. As such, we may not find significant or consistent cross-sectional or time-
series results. Also, finding results in favor of one hypothesis does not rule out the 
possibility that other mechanisms affect SOA in the opposite way. In addition, it is possible 
that the macro-level political environment and micro-level political connections have 
opposite impacts on SOA. We test the joint effect in section 4.  
 
3. Data and Key Measurements  
This section details the data, measurements of political factors, and measurements of speed 
of adjustment.  
3.1 Data 
The primary source of firm-level information is China Stock Market & Accounting 
Research (CSMAR). CSMAR provides detailed financial statements, stock returns, and 
corporate governance information about Chinese firms publicly listed on the Shanghai and 
Shenzhen stock exchanges.  
We collect information about firm-level political connections using the CVs of top 
executives and board members from SinoFIN. Political leaders’ profiles and work 
experience are from ChinaVitae, an online cohort that organizes information regarding 
Chinese politicians through multiple official sources. State- and provincial-level macro 
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information is from the National Bureau of Statistics of China. We also utilize the Political 
Uncertainty Index (China) from Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2012) to build a measure of 
firm-level political exposure, which we discuss in the following section.  
The sample covers 1990 to 2014, and it includes 2,657 unique firms as well as around 
24,972 firm-year observations. 6  Summary statistics are in table 1, panel A. Variable 
construction is detailed in appendix A.  
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
3.2 Measure of Political Factors 
We employ two sets of political factors to capture macro- and micro-level political 
influence. “Political environment” refers to the business operations setting that is affected 
by changes in political leaders, major revisions in political policy, global political incidents, 
etc. “Political connections” are the micro-level ties between political leaders and firms. 
They are firms’ intangible assets. We sort the political factors into macro and micro levels 
by determining whether certain factors are subject to change by the underlying firm.  
As the literature acknowledges, there is no perfect measure of political power among 
leaders. Hence, we employ multiple proxies for political environment and political 
connections for more generalizable conclusions; most are adopted from extant literature.   
3.2.1 Macro-Level Political Environment 
The political environment in the context of this paper refers to political factors that affect 
how a firm ranks and selects projects, chooses external funding, and achieves targeted 
outcomes. Political environment incorporates government actions at regional, national, and 
international levels that affect legal, fiscal, monetary, foreign affairs, and other policies. To 
 
6 Some of the political factors are missing, including the calculated political exposure (EXPOSURE) measure, 
as some companies have missing stock return information during the sample period. As such, due to missing 
values for some of the political factor variables, the total number of observations for some subsample analyses 
is less than 24,972. 
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quantify the political environment within China, we employ four province-level 
measurements. These four factors are not subject to change by the underlying firm.7   
The first proxy is a binary variable that captures whether the incumbent president 
and/or the premier of China were born or have worked in a certain province. A few studies, 
including Kriner and Reeves (2015), use a similar measure to examine if a politician’s 
hometown receives preferable treatment. We call this political affiliation (AFF) between a 
specific province and the head of the state. This seemingly coarse measure provides an 
interesting angle because provinces with direct affiliations with head(s) of state usually 
enjoy special favorable political treatment and policy flexibility (e.g., Piotroski and Zhang, 
2014).  
The second proxy stems from incumbent provincial leaders. They are naturally 
expected to have paramount authority over the operational business environment within 
the province and are responsible for the province’s economic performance (usually 
quantified as GDP growth). In addition, their political status and rank within the 
Communist Party of China (CPC) have a direct impact on the political environment in the 
province.  
We focus on the party secretary and governor of each province. They are, respectively, 
the number one and number two political figures at the provincial level. To scale their 
political power, we create a discrete variable that captures the locations of the leaders’ 
positions (ORIGIN) before they assume their posts as provincial leaders.8 The variable 
equals 1 if the politician is from the central government, 2 if from another province, and 3 
if from the local province. This categorical approach is based on the assumption and 
common belief that a politician who assumes a provincial leadership position from a central 
government post has stronger connections with the core of the CPC (in Beijing) and 
 
7 One may argue that a firm can relocate and strengthen the impact from some macro-level political factors. 
However, relocation can be very costly for Chinese public firms, as it is associated with loss of previously 
accumulated political advantages. 
8  Ansolabehere and Snyder (2006) and Jia, Kudamatsu, and Seim (2015) use a similar proxy for the 
provincial-level government political measure.  
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therefore has greater political power compared to those from other provinces or who are 
promoted locally.  
The third proxy captures the political power of provincial leaders. We create a binary 
variable (BURO) that measures whether the province governor or provincial party secretary 
eventually become a member of the Politburo.9 The Central Politburo of the Communist 
Party of China is a group of 25 people who oversee the CPC and, as such, is the top 
decision-making committee in China. The power of the Politburo resides largely in the fact 
that its members generally simultaneously hold state-level positions and have control over 
personnel appointments. Thus, provincial leaders who eventually become Politburo 
members have top-tier power within the CPC. Note that this measurement biases against 
recent data points, as we do know which incumbent provincial leaders will eventually 
become members of the Politburo. However, our results are unaffected if we truncate the 
sample to the pre-2003 period.  
The fourth proxy is a continuous variable that captures political pluralism (PLU) at the 
provincial level; it is a measure from Hasan, Song, and Wachtel (2014). Prior to the 1990s, 
the People’s Congress of China included almost only CPC members.10 In recent years, 
approximately one-third of the seats in the national and provincial People’s Congresses of 
China have informally been reserved for members of minority political parties and other 
independent members, and there is significant variation among provinces. In addition to 
party differences, differences exist in the composition of interest groups within provincial 
congresses. We collect data from provincial statistical yearbooks for the distribution of 
congress members from five “classes”: workers, cadres, military officers, intellectuals, and 
others. Using this information, we create a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) based on 
the sum of squares of the proportions of each of the five types of members in the congress. 
We use 1-HHI as a proxy for provincial-level political pluralism (PLU). Thus, a higher 
PLU indicates higher political pluralism. 
 
9  Literature well acknowledges the power of Politburo members in China’s decision-making. See, for 
example, Wang, Zou, and Wang (2014) 
10 The People's Congress of China serves as the legislature. Under China's current constitution, the congress 
is structured as a unicameral legislature, with the power to legislate, the power to oversee the operations of 
the government, and the power to elect the major officers.  
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The summary statistics are in table 1, panel B. Around 16.5% of firms are in provinces 
affiliated with incumbent state leaders. A majority of provincial governors and provincial 
party secretaries are from other provinces or promoted locally. The political pluralism 
measure is well distributed and displays a level of high concentration (we use 1-HHI; thus, 
the mean of HHI is around 0.772). 
3.2.2 Micro-Level Political Connections 
Political connections are difficult to quantify. We adopt three proxies, including a novel 
approach to capture a firm’s time-variant exposure to political uncertainty. These are the 
factors that firms are able to change over time. 
The first and simplest proxy indicates whether a public firm is under state control 
(STATE). 11  We consider a firm a state-owned enterprise (SOE) if its controlling 
shareholder (largest shareholder) is either a central or provincial government agency or is 
a state-owned enterprise. Under this definition, the average state-owned firm has a state 
ownership between 40% and 42% across the sample period. This is a strong cutoff, as the 
state could still control many firms in various ways. Thus, this measure should work against 
us.  
The second proxy captures the political status of firms’ top executives. Motivated by 
the leadership literature, if the CPC appoints a firm’s top executives, including the CEO, 
chairman of the board, and/or president, or the executives are members of the CPC, the 
firm possesses strong political power.12 Thus, we create a binary variable (CPC_MEMBER) 
that equals 1 if the CPC appoints the top executives or the executives are members of the 
CPC.13 
 
11  See Szamosszegi and Cole (2011) for a comprehensive discussion of state-owned enterprises and state 
capitalism in China. 
12 The executive’s political status has great implications on how she makes decisions and how political 
factors influence those decisions (Chen, Ezzamel, and Cai, 2011). In return, the status opens doors and 
becomes an intangible asset for the firm.  
13 The party status of top executives is from CSMAR and iFind. We cross-check the information with a Baidu 
search for maximum coverage. A firm is CPC-related when one of its top executives is a CPC member.    
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The third proxy adopts a novel approach to create a time-variant firm-level exposure to 
political uncertainty.14 We call it political exposure (EXPOSURE).15 Instead of quantifying 
the firm’s ex ante connections with the political party, we use the ex post outcome of firms’ 
political exposure to political uncertainty. Specifically, we assume that the capital market 
is aware of a firm’s political exposure and incorporates it into the stock price. Thus, the 
sensitivity of a firm’s stock returns with regard to changes in political uncertainty should 
capture its level of political exposure. As such, we regress firms’ stock returns on changes 
in political uncertainty, in addition to the market risk premium, with the following model: 
 𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝐸𝑃𝑖 ∙ 𝑅𝑃𝑡 + 𝛾𝑀𝑖 ∙ 𝑅𝑀𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (1) 
in which, 𝑅𝑖𝑡 is a firm’s monthly risk premium, and 𝑅𝑃𝑡 is the monthly percentage 
change in China’s Political Uncertainty Index from Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2012). 𝑅𝑀𝑡 
is the monthly value weighted market-risk premium. The coefficient 𝐸𝑃𝑖  captures the 
sensitivity of the firm’s stock returns to changes in political uncertainty. We calculate 
political exposure 𝐸𝑃𝑖 over a 36-month window. The results remain robust with a 24-month 
window. We use the absolute value of 𝐸𝑃𝑖 as the proxy for a firm’s political exposure. Note 
that by including 𝑅𝑀𝑡, we eliminate the systematic impact of the political environment on 
the market level. Thus, 𝐸𝑃𝑖 captures the firm-level idiosyncratic political exposure. 
The summary statistics for the micro-level proxies are in table 1, panel B. The state 
controls around 20.5% of the firms. In a subsample consisting of the political status of 
firms’ top executives, 76.5% of firms have CPC member executives. The political exposure 
measure is well distributed. 
To pave the way for multivariate analysis, we look at firm-level capital market 
activities. Specifically, we look at the frequency and size of capital-market access for net 
equity, bonds, and loans.16 We compare frequency and size for groups of firms across the 
 
14 Francis, Hasan, and Zhu (2014) use a similar measure in a U.S. context to create a firm-level, time-variant, 
political-exposure measure for U.S. public firms.  
15 We acknowledge that political exposure (EXPOSURE) captures the impact of both macro-level and micro-
level political factors at the firm level. However, because a firm can change its political exposure by gaining 
or losing political connections, we thus consider it a micro-level political measure. 
16 The loan information is from CSMAR, the equity and bond information are from iFind.  
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spectrum of seven political factors. The summary statistics and univariate tests are in table 
1, panel C. In almost all the univariate tests, we find that firms in stronger political 
environments and firms with stronger political connections have more frequent access to 
the capital markets and larger sizes of adjustment, supporting the aptitude hypothesis. 
3.3 Measure of Speed of Adjustment 
The key variable of interest is the firms’ speed of adjustment of capital structure. We use 
two approaches to calculate static and time-variant SOAs.   
3.3.1 Static Measure of Speed of Adjustment 
One empirical challenge for the SOA measure is that it requires multiple years of data to 
evaluate the optimal capital structure for one firm. Thus, in most studies, SOA is a static 
value across firms and years.  
We follow the methodology detailed in Oztekin and Flannery (2012).  
𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑗,𝑡 − 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1 = 𝜆𝑗(𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑗,𝑡
∗ − 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1) + 𝛿𝑖𝑗,𝑡  (2) 
𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑗,𝑡
∗ = 𝛽𝑗𝑋𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝐹𝑖𝑗      (3) 
Equation (2) explicitly illustrates the definition of speed of adjustment, in which 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑗,𝑡
∗  
is the optimal leverage ratio of firm i in year t, and province j, determined by a number of 
macro-level and firm-level factors, as in equation (3); 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1denotes the observed 
leverage ratio in the previous year, 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑗,𝑡  denotes the observed leverage ratio in the 
current year, 𝛿𝑖𝑗,𝑡 is the error term, and coefficient 𝜆𝑗 is the SOA of interest. We follow the 
literature and define Leverage as the total book value of debt divided by firm’s market 
value of assets. Market-value of assets is calculated as total assets minus book equity plus 
market value of equity. 
Equation (3) simplifies the way in which the firm’s optimal leverage ratio acts as a 
function of firm and macroeconomic characteristics (Frank and Goyal, 2009). Following 
Flannery and Rangan (2006), we include a set of firm fixed effects to control for 
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unobserved firm heterogeneity. The choice of determinants of optimal leverage ratio, 
𝑋𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1 , are motivated by Gamba and Triantis (2008). We use firm size, profitability, 
tangibility, nondebt tax shields, market-to-book ratio, and state ownership as firm-level 
factors; at the macro level, we include GDP growth, inflation, unemployment, risk-free 
rate, and CPI.17  
Substituting equation (3) into (2), we have the following equation for empirical 
implementations: 
𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑗,𝑡 = (1-𝜆𝑗) 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1+(𝜆𝑗𝛽𝑗) 𝑋𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1+𝜆𝑗𝐹𝑖𝑗+𝛿𝑖𝑗,𝑡   (4) 
The coefficient of 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1 is 1-𝜆𝑗, and 𝜆𝑗 is the calculated speed of adjustment for 
province j over the period. A larger value of 𝜆𝑗 suggests faster SOA.  
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
As show in table 2, the average SOA (𝝺) of the entire sample period (1990-2014) is 
19.6%, indicating that it takes around 2.55 years for an average firm to halve its optimal 
leverage.18 This result is very similar to the one in Qian, Tian, and Wirjanto (2009), who 
report an average SOA of 18.5% for the 1999-2004 China sample.  
When we break the whole sample into pre-2003 (Jiang Zemin) and post-2003 (Hu 
Jintao) regimes, the SOAs are 28.30% and 18.10%, respectively. The reduction in SOA 
accompanies the rapid development of the capital markets, product competition, GDP, and 
almost every aspect of society in China over time. It is pointless to compare the absolute 
levels of political uncertainty between the two political regimes because the post-2003 
regime is labeled the “Harmonious Society,” reflecting one of Hu Jintao’s top-priority 
socio-economic visions (Fan, 2006).19  
 
17 It is possible that a firm’s political exposure can determine leverage. In empirical tests without the political 
exposure measurement, we include it as part of the determinant variables in calculating SOA. The results 
remain robust.  
18 0.5/19.6%=2.55 
19 China's Party Leadership Declares New Priority: ‘Harmonious Society,’ by Maureen Fan, Washington Post 
Foreign Service, Thursday, October 12, 2006. 
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3.3.2 Time-Variant Measure of Speed of Adjustment 
The traditional SOA measure is based on the coefficient of a regression. Its static nature 
poses a challenge to investigate the determinants of SOA. Hence, we adopt the approach 
in Colak, Flannery, and Oztekin (2015) to address this issue.  
We first calculate the predicted firm-year level optimal leverage ratio 𝑂𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑗,𝑡̂  with 
SOA measured from equation (3): 
𝑂𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑗,𝑡̂ = 𝛽?̂? 𝑋𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1    (5) 
Thus, the deviation from the optimal leverage ratio, 𝐷𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑗,𝑡̂ , can be expressed as: 
𝐷𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑗,𝑡̂ = 𝑂𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑗,𝑡̂ −𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1   (6) 
If we believe that a firm’s SOA is affected by political influence, as: 
𝜆𝑖𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛾𝑖.𝑗.𝑡−1𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑖.𝑗.𝑡−1   (7) 
we can substitute equations (6) and (7) into equation (2). Thus: 
𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑗,𝑡 − 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1 = 𝛾𝑖.𝑗.𝑡−1𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑖.𝑗.𝑡−1(𝐷𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑗,𝑡̂ )+ 𝛿𝑖𝑗,𝑡 (8) 
in which the coefficient 𝛾𝑖.𝑗.𝑡−1 represents the political influence on a firm’s SOA.   
It is noteworthy that some political factors do not vary greatly over time; thus, we 
conduct some tests with the static measure of SOA. We use time-variant measures of SOA 
to test for more time-varying political factors.  
3.4 Methodology 
To deal with the autocorrelation of leverage and to avoid a biased adjustment-speed 
estimate, we adopt a two-step generalized method of moments (GMM) (Arellano and Bond 
1991; Blundell and Bond, 1998). This approach is widely adopted in SOA studies.  
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We have a reasonably long panel from 1990 to 2014, although we carry out some tests 
with shorter panel subsamples. To address the empirical concerns resulting from a short 
time horizon and a large number of firm observations, we also estimate the regression 
parameters in first differences to eliminate firm fixed effects. For the lagged instrument 
variables, we follow the SOA literature and use the second to fourth lagged variables. The 
results are robust to the change of this setting.  
To estimate 𝛾𝑖.𝑗.𝑡−1 , we take a two-step approach. We first estimate equation (4) for 𝜆 
and 𝛽?̂? . With the firm-year level optimal leverage ratio 𝑂𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑗,𝑡̂ and distance 𝐷𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑗,𝑡̂  
calculated from equations (5) and (6), we further estimate equation (8) with OLS.  
The debt structure for publicly listed Chinese firms is slightly different from their U.S. 
counterparts. Most Chinese companies rely on short-term bank loans, as long-term loan 
contracts are seldom offered, and the bond market is not a common option for a majority 
of firms. As Qian, Tian, and Wirjanto (2009) argue, most companies in China maintain 
their short-term debt for a year or so after the expiration dates, so that short-term debt can 
easily become long-term debt over time, although it is still recorded as short-term debt on 
the balance sheet. Thus, we use the market-debt ratio as a leverage measure, defined as a 
firm’s total book value of debt divided by firm’s market value of assets. Market-value of 
assets is calculated as total assets minus book equity plus market value of equity. 
4. Main Results and Mechanisms 
The nature of static SOA measurements poses an empirical challenge: it is not feasible to 
test the moderating effect of certain variables on the link between political factors and SOA. 
As such, to explore the moderating effect, we rely on the calculation of SOA of subsamples 
and time-variant measurements of SOA.  
4.1 Impact of Macro-Level Political Environment on Firms’ Speed of Adjustment 
The first proxy of macro-level political environment is the affiliations (AFF) of the General 
Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPC (as well as the president of China) and the 
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Chinese premier. More specifically, we look at the provinces where the state leaders were 
born and/or worked. The information is from ChinaVitae.20  
The General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPC is the number one political 
figure in China. (Although it is commonly acknowledged that Deng Xiaoping, who never 
held that office, was paramount leader of China from late 1970s until he passed away on 
February 19, 1997).  
Jiang Zemin was born in Jiangsu province and worked in Shanghai, Jilin, and Beijing 
throughout his entire political career.21 He was general secretary of the Central Committee 
of the CPC from June 24, 1989, to November 15, 2002; president of the People's Republic 
of China from March 27, 1993, to March 15, 2003; and chairman of the Central Military 
Commission from March 19, 1990, to March 8, 2005. Jiang remained powerful and 
influential after Hu Jintao took office. However, to simplify our empirical test, we consider 
the pre-2003 period to be Jiang’s regime. Hu Jintao was also born in Jiangsu and worked 
in Gansu, Guizhou, Tibet, and Beijing.22 As the successor of Jiang, Hu took office as 
general secretary and state president at the end of 2002 and the beginning of 2003, 
respectively. He became the chairman of the Central Military Commission in March 2005. 
We consider the post-2003 period to be Hu’s regime. Xi Jinping took the state leadership 
in 2013. However, because our sample period ends in 2014, the time period is too short to 
include a valid subsample for Xi’s regime. Thus, we divide our main sample into Jiang’s 
and Hu’s regimes.  
The premier of the People’s Republic of China is the number two political figure in 
China. Our sample covers three premiers: Li Peng, from March 25, 1988, to March 17, 
1998; Zhu Rongji, from March 17, 1998, to March 16, 2003; and Wen Jiabao from March 
16, 2003, to March 15, 2013. Li was born in Shanghai and worked in Heilongjiang, Jilin, 
 
20 More detailed information is listed in appendix B. 
21 Jiang Zemin Jiang was born on August 17, 1926, in the city of Yangzhou, Jiangsu. His ancestral home was 
in Anhui. The results are not affected if we include Anhui as his affiliated province.  
22 Hu Jintao was born on December 21, 1942, in Jiangsu province. His branch of the family migrated from 
Anhui to Jiangsu during his grandfather's generation. The results are not affected if we include Anhui as his 
affiliated province.  
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Liaoning, and Beijing; Zhu was born in Hunan and worked in Shanghai and Beijing; Wen 
was born in Tianjin and worked in Gansu and Beijing. 
In the pre-2003 (Jiang) period, we label Jiangsu, Shanghai, Jilin, Beijing, Heilongjiang, 
Liaoning, and Hunan as affiliated provinces and label the rest unaffiliated; in the post-2003 
(Hu) period, we label Jiangsu, Gansu, Guizhou, Tibet, Beijing, and Tianjin as affiliated 
provinces, and the rest are unaffiliated. 
We then look at the SOA for firms headquartered in the affiliated provinces of state 
leaders during their terms, as well as those headquartered in other provinces, under the 
assumption that affiliated provinces receive certain privileges in government purchases, 
policy and regulatory autonomy, fiscal freedoms, etc. The political advantage trickles down 
to the micro level, so that firms in those provinces may consequently receive preferable 
political treatment.  
[Insert Table 3 Here] 
The results are in table 3, panel A. Note that due to the space concerns, we report a 
condensed summary of calculated SOAs. Consistent with previous measures, SOAs during 
the pre-2003 period are significantly larger than those in the post-2003 period. For firms in 
the affiliated provinces, SOAs are also larger than those in unaffiliated provinces. For 
instance, in the pre-2003 period, firms in the seven provinces affiliated with state leaders 
have an average SOA of 33.2%, while firms in unaffiliated provinces have an average SOA 
of 25.5%. The numbers during the post-2003 period are 20.2% and 17.1%, respectively. 
The results indicate that firms adjust to their optimal capital structures much faster if they 
are in provinces affiliated with state leaders. This is in line with the aptitude hypothesis, 
which predicts that a firm in an environment with stronger political advantages has a higher 
speed of adjustment.  
The second proxy goes to the provincial level: ORIGIN captures the location of the 
provincial leaders’ previous positions before they assume their current posts. The variable 
equals 1, 2, or 3 if the politician previously worked in central government, in another 
province, or was promoted from a local province, respectively. Those from the central 
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government are commonly believed to have stronger connections to the core of the power 
structure and therefore have greater political status. The results are in table 3, panel B.  
The results show that firms in a given province have a higher SOA (26.5%) when the 
provincial governor has a central government background. When the governor is from 
another province or was promoted directly from the current province, the SOAs are 19.0% 
and 20.1%, respectively). However, when the party secretary has a central government 
background, firms in that province have an SOA of 19.2%, slightly lower than those where 
the party secretary is from another province or is promoted directly from the current 
province (the SOAs are 22.1% and 20.5%, respectively).  
In unreported results, we jointly consider the political origin of both leaders. We find 
that firms have an SOA of 39.5% when both the governor and party secretary are from the 
central government, but other combinations of the two yield an SOA around 20%. Hence, 
there is some evidence that provincial leaders’ central government background does help 
raise firms’ SOA within an affiliated province. However, the results are more significant 
for the office of provincial governor or if both provincial leaders are from the central 
government.  
The third proxy (BURO) captures whether a provincial governor or a provincial party 
secretary eventually becomes a member of the Politburo. As in table 3, panel C, firms in 
provinces where provincial leaders have future Politburo appointments have an SOA of 
28.0%, while firms headquartered in other provinces have a significantly lower SOA of 
18.9%. 23  This finding is consistent with our prior results that firms in political 
environments with stronger political advantages are associated with faster SOA. 
The fourth proxy, political pluralism (PLU), captures the diversification of political 
representation of the Provincial People’s Congresses of China. As shown in table 3, panel 
D, we find that firms in provinces with higher levels of political pluralism adjust to their 
optimal capital structures faster than others (SOA 21.4% versus 19.5%), which is consistent 
 
23 The results are qualitatively unaffected when we restrict the sample to the pre-2003 period to address 
sample selection issues, because it is unclear whether incumbent provincial leaders during the later sample 
(post-2003) eventually take positions in the Politburo. 
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with our conjecture and in line with the common knowledge that diversified political 
environments benefit firms.  
In addition, we conducted Chi-squared test for the statistical significance of calculated 
static SOAs between sub groups, and in all the scenarios, the difference of SOAs are 
significant at or above 1% level24.  
In summary, with all four proxies that capture the macro-level political environment, 
we find that firms headquartered in environments with stronger political advantages have 
faster SOAs, supporting aptitude hypothesis H1a.  
4.2 Impact of Micro-Level Political Connections on Firms’ Speed of Adjustment 
We now investigate the impact of micro-level political connections on firms’ SOA. The 
first proxy is the level of state control (STATE) among public firms. As shown in table 4, 
panel A, SOEs have an SOA of 21.40%, while the non-SOEs adjust their optimal capital 
structures at the rate of 19.20%. This finding supports hypothesis H2a (i.e., that political 
connections are positively related to SOA).  
[Insert Table 4 Here] 
The second measure, CPC_MEMBER, equals 1 if the CPC appoints top executives 
and/or the executives are members of the CPC. As shown in table 4, panel B, we find that 
firms with CPC members as top executives show an SOA of 17.90%, but those that do not 
have a lower SOA of 16.60%. This result is consistent with the previous one, supporting 
the aptitude hypothesis. Note that half of the observations have missing value on 
CPC_MEMBER, thus the value of SOA is not comparable to other tests.  
Last, we conduct a test with the novel measure of time-variant firm-level political 
exposure (EXPOSURE). This variable captures the sensitivity of firms’ stock returns to 
changes in the political environment as a measure of firm-level political risk. We sort the 
firms into two groups with based on political exposure. Firms with above-median exposure 
have an SOA of 16.9%, but firms with below-median exposure have an SOA of 21.7%, 
 
24 We thank two anonymous referees for this suggestion.  
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indicating that low political exposure (or a high level of political connections) is associated 
with faster SOA.  
To further examine if the effect is linear, we sort firms into tertiles. Firms with high, 
median, and low levels of political exposure have SOAs of 17.3%, 19.0%, and 25.8%, 
respectively, suggesting that political exposure has a linear effect on firms’ SOA. This 
result reaffirms the aptitude hypothesis that political connection is positively related to 
SOA. The Chi-squared tests show that the difference of SOAs are all significant at or above 
1% level. 
Jointly, we show that all three micro-level political connection measures support 
aptitude hypothesis H2a, suggesting that firms with stronger micro-level political 
connections adjust faster to their optimal capital structures.  
4.3 Political Impact on Time-Variant Firm-Level Speed of Adjustment 
One drawback of the previous results is that we lack the capability to unveil the dynamic 
and linear impacts of political measures on contemporary SOA when analyzing SOAs 
among groups subject to various political measures. Thus, we continue the empirical tests 
with equation (8), which enables investigation of the incremental effect of political 
influence on normal SOA levels.  
As mentioned, in equation (8) the dependent variable is the change in leverage from 
the previous period: 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑗,𝑡 − 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1. We then regress it on the interaction terms of 
political factors and the deviation from the optimal leverage ratio, 𝐷𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑗,𝑡̂ . We 
standardize all the political factors to have a mean of zero and standard deviation of 1, and 
then we multiply by 𝐷𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑗,𝑡̂  to ease the interpretation of the results. 
The results are presented in table 5, panel A. Columns (1) to (5) examine the effect of 
each political measure separately; columns (6) to (9) examine the effect by bringing 
multiple political measures together.   
 [Insert Table 5 Here] 
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The results in columns (1) to (4) are consistent with those in previous sections. For 
example, a higher general (country) level of Political Uncertainty Index is related to 
lower SOA. Economically, a one-standard-deviation increase in the index is associated 
with a 4.9% reduction in SOA. A one-standard-deviation increase in PLU (a higher level 
means lower concentration, thus lower political pluralism) is associated with a 5.0% 
reduction in SOA. A local provincial state secretary (higher ORIGIN) is also associated 
with a lower SOA, and a higher level of political exposure (EXPOSURE) leads to lower 
SOA.   
Columns (6) to (9) bring multiple measures of macro- and micro-level political 
influence together. We find consistent results, except that the coefficients of ORIGIN 
change the sign to positive, indicating that a local provincial state secretary (higher 
ORIGIN) is associated with higher SOA. Although this result is not in line with previous 
ones, its coefficient may simply pick up the time-series effect rather than the cross-
sectional effect because the macro-level measures of political environment can be 
correlated and ORIGIN changes infrequently. We further explain this in the following 
section. 
In general, by examining the effect of political factors on dynamic measures of SOA, 
we strengthen our previous support for hypotheses H1a and H2a. That is, both the macro-
level political environment and micro-level political connections are positively related to 
firms’ speed of adjustment.  
4.4 Interaction of the Political Environment and Political Connections/Risk  
We now combine the macro and micro levels of political measures and investigate their 
joint effect on SOA. We select political pluralism (PLU) and Politburo (BURO) as the 
proxies for the macro level, and we select political exposure (EXPOSURE) for the micro 
level. The results are robust to other combinations of measures. The results are shown in 
table 6.  
[Insert Table 6 Here] 
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As shown, firms adjust their optimal structures fastest (SOA= 26.9%) when they have 
lower political exposure and are in provinces with high levels of political pluralism. The 
lowest SOA (16.8%) comes from firms with higher political exposure and in provinces 
with high levels of political pluralism, suggesting that micro-level political risk is more 
influential than macro-level political environment in determining a firm’s SOA.  
With the Politburo as the macro-level political environment proxy, we find similar 
results. Firms with lower political exposure in environments with stronger political 
advantages have the highest SOA (42.6%), and firms with higher political exposure in 
weaker political environments have the lowest SOA (18.8%).  The Chi-squared tests show 
that the difference of SOAs are all significant at or above 1% level. 
In short, the results are consistent with previous findings and further reveal that micro-
level political connections may play a more significant role in influencing SOA. 
5. Robustness Checks and Discussion  
5.1 Endogeneity Control 
The main results raise concerns of endogeneity because the link between political influence 
and SOA may be merely a correlation, or causality may run from the SOA to political 
measures rather than vice versa. The reverse causality concern is easier to address because, 
as in many political realms, especially in China, political power trickles down from the 
central government to every corner of the economy, making it almost impossible for firms 
to affect the state superstructure with their fiscal policies. Indeed, a large number of studies 
in political economics (e.g., Julio and Yook, 2016; Colak, Durnev, and Qian, 2016) assume 
that political influence, such as presidential elections and foreign policy, is independent of 
daily operational activities regardless of its size.  
However, it is still necessary to investigate the causal effect of political factors. To do 
so, we follow Giannetti, Liao, and Yu (2015), and use the enactment of provincial-level 
policies that attract highly skilled emigrants as an exogenous shock to political factors.   
Since in the 1980s, the number of students from China who study abroad has increased. 
According to Project Atlas, the total number of Chinese international students reached 
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459,800 in 2014, of which around 304,040 came to the United States, representing 31.2% 
of the total U.S. international student body at that time.25  In the early days, Chinese 
immigrants would work and stay abroad after finishing their education; however, a sizable 
number began returning to China from the early 2000s onward. According to the Chinese 
Statistics Bureau, the number of individuals with foreign academic or training backgrounds 
returning to China in 2014 reached 370,000, an increase of 3.2% over 2013. The forecast 
for 2017 is that the inflow of returnees will exceed the outflow of new international students 
for the first time ever.  
The returnees bring back academic and industrial knowledge and experience, as well 
as an understanding of and a desire for democracy. From the late 1990s, provincial 
governments started to adopt policies to attract highly skilled emigrants, and they did so at 
different points in time.26 Although the main objectives of these policies were to enhance 
Chinese academic and industrial research, promote entrepreneurial activity, and facilitate 
the entry of new businesses, the implementation of such policies imposed subtle changes 
on the local political environment because well-educated returnees demand not only 
promised packages of subsidized housing, tax benefits, and local grants and awards, but 
also an improved and more open political and business environment.  
We thus use the enactment of provincial policies for attracting expatriates and 
emigrants as an exogenous shock. We expect it to have a certain impact on political factors, 
but not (at least not directly) firms’ speed of adjustment. Given the nature of the policy 
enactment as a provincial-level shock, we use it as an instrumental variable for macro-level 
political pluralism and micro-level political exposure, because the country-level measures 
Political Uncertainty Index and Affiliation to the State Leader (AFF) do not capture 
provincial-level policies. The micro-level state control (STATE) and top executive’s 
political status (CCP_MEMBER) do not vary greatly over time.27 
 
25 http://www.iie.org/en/Services/Project-Atlas/United-States 
26 A full list of the data can be found in Giannetti, Liao, and Yu (2015) 
27 We follow the suggestion from one anonymous referee and cross-check top executives’ political status 
with the information from Baidu searches to ensure maximum coverage. 
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Empirically, we use a two-stage least squares (2SLS) approach. In the first stage 
(unreported), we regress the political variables on emigrant policy, a set of firm-level 
control variables and firm fixed effects. In the second stage, we adopt equation (8) and use 
the estimated political variables from the first-stage results as the political variables. The 
results are in table 7.  
[Insert Table 7 Here] 
As shown, we find consistent results, both economically and statistically, supporting 
hypotheses H1a and H2a, reaffirming our main argument. Also, we conduct a number of 
tests to ensure the appropriateness of the instruments. The Cragg-Donald Wald statistics 
generate greater value than the Stock-Yogo weak-identification test critical values (Stock 
and Yogo, 2004), rejecting the null hypothesis that the instruments are weak. The Sargan 
statistics for the overidentification tests of all instruments yield large p-values, which fails 
to reject the null hypothesis that all instruments are exogenous. The Anderson LM statistics 
strongly reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are underidentified. These tests, 
together with the results, provide strong support that political influence has a causal impact 
on firms’ SOA.  
5.2 Significant Change in Political Position, Financial Constraint, and Market 
Financing Conditions28 
With the time-variant SOA, we further delve into the previously documented positive 
impact of political factors on firm’s SOA.  
First, we ask if significant change in political positions lead to changes in firm-level 
SOA. In another word, if firms with weak political connections or operate in areas with 
weaker political environment are able to invest or acquire additional political position to 
improve their speed of adjustment.  
[Insert Table 8 Here] 
 
28 We thank two anonymous referees for the comments that led to this section.  
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We conduct univariate tests with the dynamic SOA for firms that experience significant 
improvement in their political positions. The results are in table 8, panel A. We observe 
strong and significant improvement in SOA for firms that increase their political positions. 
Similarly, we examine the change in SOA for firms that experience declines in their 
political positions, and we find the opposite results hold; that is, these firms have slower 
SOA afterward.  
Second, given that political advantage is positively related with financial flexibility, we 
explore if such positive impact is more pronounced for firms with financial constraints or 
more pronounced during monetary tightening periods.  
We use the z-score to sort firms into those with high and low levels of financial 
constraint, and we use the reserve requirement ratio (RRR) set by the People’s Bank of 
China to gauge the ease of monetary policy (Allen, Gu & Qian, 2017). We separate the 
sample period into monetary tightening and monetary easing periods using the median 
RRR. The results are in table 8, panel B.  
As shown, for firms with high financial constraints during monetary tightening periods, 
we observe more distinct political impact on SOA, both economically and statistically. In 
addition, we find that the coefficients for ORIGIN and STATE change signs between firms 
with high financial constraints and firms with low financial constraints, as well as between 
the monetary tightening and monetary easing periods. This provides new insights into the 
impact of ORIGIN and STATE, suggesting that when resources are limited or when 
favorable decisions are made, firms in politically advantageous positions benefit at the 
expense of the politically disadvantaged. 
In columns (3) and (6) of panel B, we use Chi-squared test for the significance of the 
difference in political influence between high and low financially constraints firms and 
monetary tightening and easing periods. In most of the cases, the differences are 
statistically significant29.  
 
29 We thank one anonymous referee for the suggestion to include this test.  
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In aggregate, the new results provide additional support for the aptitude hypothesis that 
firms change SOA when their political positions change. In addition, the documented 
positive political influence on SOA is more pronounced for firms with financial constraints 
during monetary tightening periods.  
5.3 Discussion 
We show that both macro- and micro-level political factors have a positive and causal 
effect on firms’ speed of adjustment. The link and the findings have several implications. 
First, we argue in section 2 that political factors may affect a firm’s capital structure in 
both directions. Political connections grant firms to have short-cut access to capital markets 
and protect firms from legal complications when they face financial distress. Our results 
consistently support the conjecture that firms adjust to their optimal capital structures and 
reap the benefits associated with target debt ratios. We do not, however, completely rule 
out the possibility that some firms, though they may have opportunities for external 
financing, still choose to deviate from their optimal leverage ratios. Thus, our results should 
be interpreted as quantitatively conservative. In other words, firms with stronger political 
connections or those operating in political environments with stronger political advantages 
should be able to adjust to their optimal leverage faster than we have documented if they 
choose to do so.   
Second, we hypothesize that politically connected firms may not always adjust to their 
optimal leverage, because executives lack strong financial knowledge and/or because of 
other political priorities. However, we do not find that such channels dominate the way 
firms project their capital-structure decisions. On the contrary, firms that are in better 
political positions act to their own advantage. It is possible that the executives of state-
owned firms may be less financially knowledgeable or act on other agendas under the 
influence of the government, but the stronger political advantages they possess overcome 
such weaknesses.  
Third, the literature provides abundant evidence that politician/firm or 
politician/manager connections are important for external financing and cost of capital. For 
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further study, it would be interesting to examine the effects of these specific personnel-
level links and look into their overall impact on firms’ speed of adjustment to their optimal 
capital structure.   
6. Conclusion 
This paper examines how political factors, including both macro-level political 
environment and micro-level political connections, affect the speed at which firms adjust 
their capital structures. We conduct an empirical investigation within the political realm of 
China, where the single-party political system provides an ideal setting to quantify political 
factors, in contrast to Western countries where politically induced business cycles create 
bipartisan policy changes and confound micro-level political connections.  
We find that at the macro level, firms operating in environments with higher political 
advantages (proxied by a province’s affiliation to the head of state as well as provincial 
leaders’ political status and rank in the party) enjoy higher speed of adjustment; at the 
micro level, firms owned by the state, firms with CPC members as executives, and firms 
bearing lower exposure to changes in political uncertainty also have higher speed of 
adjustment. The effect is economically significant. For example, in provinces where 
political leaders possess higher political status and rank, firms adjust to their SOA 48% 
faster than those in other provinces. State-owned firms and firms with CPC members as 
executives also enjoy around 8% faster SOA than their counterparts.  
Our findings enhance the understanding of how political influence affects firms’ capital 
structures in general, as a collective effect of its impact on financing, cost of capital, and 
other firm-level decision-making. These findings in turn shed light on how politically 
induced capital-structure changes affect other decision-making at the firm level.  
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Appendix A: Variable Definitions 
 
Variable Name Description 
Firm Size Log of total assets 
Leverage Total book value of debt divided by firm’s market value of assets. Market-
value of assets is calculated as total assets minus book equity plus market 
value of equity.  
Tangibility Net property, plant, and equipment divided by total assets 
NDTS Nondebt tax shields, depreciation divided by total assets 
Profitability Earnings before interest and tax divided by total assets 
Market-to-Book Ratio Market-to-book ratio of a firm 
Tobin's Q Ratio of the market value of a firm's assets to the replacement cost of the 
firm's assets. 
Affiliation of the State Leader (AFF)  Binary variable that equals 1 if the state leader was born or has worked in the 
province, zero otherwise. 
Origination of the Leader (ORIGIN) The variable takes equals 1 if the politician’s previous post was from central 
governance, 2 if from another province, and 3 if from the local province. 
Political Pluralism (PLU)  Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) based on the sum of squares of the 
proportions of each of these five types of congress members: farmers and 
workers, military officers, cadres, intellectuals, and others.  
Politburo (BURO) Binary variable that equals 1 if the province leader eventually becomes a 
member of the Politburo, and zero otherwise. 
State Ownership (STATE) Binary variable that equals 1 if a firm's controlling shareholder (largest 
shareholder) is either a central or provincial government agency or state-
owned enterprise, and zero otherwise 
CPC Member/Appointment (CPC_MEMBER) Binary variable that equals 1 if firm's top executive(s) is a CPC member, and 
zero otherwise. 
Political Exposure (EXPOSURE) See main text. 
 
  
Appendix B: Political Leaders of P.R. China  
This table shows the tenure and affiliated provinces of the presidents and premiers or China from 1993 to 2013. The affiliated provinces are those in which the 
politician was born and/or has worked.   
Name Title Tenure Affiliated Provinces 
Jiang Zemin 
General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China June 24, 1989 - Nov. 15, 2002 
Jiangsu, Shanghai, Jilin, 
Beijing 
President of the People's Republic of China  Mar. 27, 1993 - Mar. 15, 2003 
Chairman of the Central Military Commission  Mar. 19, 1990 - Mar. 8, 2005 
Hu Jintao 
General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China Nov. 15, 2002 – Nov. 15, 2012 
Jiangsu, Gansu, Guizhou, 
Tibet, Beijing 
President of the People's Republic of China  Mar. 15, 2003 – Mar. 14, 2013 
Chairman of the Central Military Commission  Mar. 13, 2005 – Mar. 14, 2013 
Li Peng Premier of the People's Republic of China Mar. 25, 1988 – Mar. 17, 1998 
Heilongjiang, Jilin, 
Liaoning, Beijing  
Zhu Rongji Premier of the People's Republic of China Mar. 17, 1998 – Mar. 16, 2003 Hunan, Beijing, Shanghai 
Wen Jiabao Premier of the People's Republic of China Mar. 16, 2003 – Mar. 15, 2013 Tianjin, Gansu, Beijing 
 
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics  
Panel A shows firm characteristics and macroeconomic factors. Panel B shows the main measurements for political environment and political connection/risk. Panel C reports the 
frequency and size of capital-market access across seven political factors. *, **, and *** denote significance at 5%, 1%, and 0.1% level, respectively. Variables construction is 
detailed in appendix A.  
 
Panel A: Firm Characteristics and Macroeconomic Factors 
Variable N Mean S.D. P5 P25 P50 P75 P95 
Firm Characteristics 
Firm Size 24,972 21.37 1.27 19.59 20.53 21.2 22.03 23.75 
Leverage 24,972 0.202 0.161 0 0.0654 0.185 0.305 0.488 
Tangibility 24,972 0.262 0.179 0.0164 0.123 0.23 0.375 0.608 
NDTS 24,972 0.0207 0.0167 0 0.00839 0.0174 0.0294 0.0531 
Profitability 24,972 0.0262 0.0775 -0.104 0.0027 0.0307 0.0645 0.133 
Market-to-Book Ratio 24,972 3.392 3.139 0.173 1.586 2.603 4.276 9.006 
Tobin's Q 24,972 2.337 1.606 0.797 1.304 1.865 2.832 5.427 
 
Macroeconomic Factors 
GDP 24,972 35695 25177 5425 13539 30730 52840 85373 
Unemployment 24,972 0.256 0.15 0 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.4 
CPI 24,972 102.7 3.284 98.5 101.1 102.4 103.8 106.3 
Risk-Free Rate 24,972 4.228 1.664 3.2 3.8 3.9 3.9 9.4 
 
Panel B: Political Environment and Political Connection/Risk 
Variable N Mean S.D. P5 P25 P50 P75 P95 
Affiliation of the State Leader (AFF)  24,972 0.165 0.372 0 0 0 0 1 
Origination of the Leader (ORIGIN) Governor 24,470 2.362 0.760 1 2 3 3 3 
Origination of the Leader (ORIGIN) State Secretary 24,470 1.881 0.656 1 1 2 2 3 
Political Pluralism (PLU)  24,951 0.228 0.430 0 0 0 0 1 
Politburo (BURO) 24,470 1.041 0.0587 0.927 1.007 1.045 1.079 1.171 
State Ownership (STATE) 24,951 0.205 0.253 0 0 0.0201 0.425 0.675 
CCP Member/Appointment (CCP_MEMBER) 11,142 0.765 0.424 0 1 1 1 1 
Political Exposure (EXPOSURE) 23,879 0.0225 0.0244 0.001 0.007 0.0149 0.0283 0.0726 
 
 
Panel C: Frequency and Size of Capital Market Access across Seven Political Factors 
 Frequency of Adjustment (Percent)  Size of Adjustments (Percent) 
  Access Net Equity Net Bond Net Loan   Net Equity Net Bond Net Loan 
Affiliation of the State Leader (AFF)          
Yes 0.912 0.704 0.441 0.895  0.068 0.003 0.209 
No 0.791 0.531 0.230 0.761  0.064 0.002 0.179 
Difference 0.121*** 0.173*** 0.211*** 0.135***  0.003 0.001** 0.030*** 
Origination of the Leader (ORIGIN)         
Central Government 0.949 0.756 0.505 0.929  0.071 0.004 0.206 
Others 0.915 0.665 0.391 0.901  0.057 0.003 0.227 
Difference 0.034*** 0.092*** 0.114*** 0.028***  0.014*** 0.000 -0.021*** 
Political Pluralism (PLU)          
High 0.827 0.645 0.427 0.814  0.067 0.003 0.205 
Low 0.815 0.633 0.393 0.793  0.057 0.003 0.195 
Difference 0.012** 0.013* 0.034*** 0.021***  0.010*** 0.000 0.010*** 
Politburo (BURO)         
Yes 0.945 0.768 0.533 0.928  0.068 0.004 0.220 
No 0.923 0.607 0.271 0.898  0.064 0.002 0.209 
Difference 0.022*** 0.161*** 0.263*** 0.031***  0.004 0.002*** 0.011** 
State Ownership (STATE)         
Yes 0.857 0.670 0.381 0.832  0.055 0.003 0.244 
No 0.865 0.613 0.337 0.847  0.046 0.002 0.212 
Difference -0.008 0.056** 0.044* -0.015  0.010** 0.001* 0.033** 
CCP Member/Appointment (CCP_MEMBER)         
Yes 0.898 0.684 0.387 0.871  0.064 0.003 0.215 
No 0.853 0.601 0.328 0.837  0.042 0.003 0.216 
Difference 0.045*** 0.083*** 0.059*** 0.033***  0.022*** 0.000 -0.001 
Political Exposure (EXPOSURE)         
Low 0.899 0.684 0.453 0.885  0.044 0.004 0.225 
High 0.86 0.658 0.434 0.844  0.035 0.003 0.219 
Difference 0.038*** 0.026*** 0.019* 0.040***   0.008*** 0.001*** 0.005* 
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Table 2: Measurement of Speed of Adjustment  
This table shows the calculated SOA(𝝺). Column (1) is the entire sample. Columns (2) and (3) are for pre-2003 and post-2003 
subsamples, respectively. Columns (4) and (5) are for periods with high and low political uncertainty, respectively. Chi-squared test 
is conducted for the statistical inference of the 𝝺 between high and low political uncertainty periods. *, **, and *** denote significance 
at 5%, 1%, and 0.1% level, respectively. The way we construct the variables is detailed in appendix A. 
 
  Pre-2003 Post-2003 High PU Low PU 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variable Leverage Leverage Leverage Leverage Leverage 
            
Leverage(t-1) 0.804*** 0.717*** 0.819*** 0.817*** 0.785*** 
 (0.014) (0.055) (0.020) (0.028) (0.029) 
Firm Size 0.007*** 0.009*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.007*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Tangibility 0.057*** 0.016 0.064*** 0.044*** 0.083*** 
 (0.008) (0.013) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) 
NDTS -0.072*** -0.470*** -0.478*** -0.454*** -0.703*** 
 (0.008) (0.136) (0.087) (0.092) (0.108) 
Profitability -0.651*** -0.437*** -0.255*** -0.284*** -0.313*** 
 (0.081) (0.044) (0.019) (0.024) (0.025) 
Market-to-Book Ratio -0.004** 0.002 0.000 0.002** -0.000 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
State Ownership 0.014*** -0.011* 0.006 0.010** 0.010* 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Constant -0.121*** -0.097* -0.107*** -0.073*** -0.093*** 
 (0.016) (0.042) (0.016) (0.019) (0.020) 
      
Observations 24972 6,072 18,900 13,880 11,092 
No. Firms 2,658 1,225 2,635 2,636 2,527 
      
Speed of Adjustment (𝝺) 19.6% 28.30% 18.10% 18.3% 21.5%*** 
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Table 3: Political Environment and Speed of Adjustment  
This table shows the calculated SOA(𝝺) under various factors of political environment. The table is presented in a 
condensed pattern. Panel A uses affiliation of the state leader (AFF) as the proxy for political environment. Panel B 
uses origination of the province leader (ORIGIN) as the proxy for political environment. Panel C captures whether the 
provincial party secretary and/or governor eventually became a Politburo (BURO) member. Panel D uses political 
pluralism (PLU) as the proxy for political environment. Chi-squared test is conducted for the statistical inference of the 
𝝺 across subsamples. *, **, and *** denote significance at 5%, 1%, and 0.1% level, respectively. The way we construct 
the variables is detailed in appendix A. 
 
Panel A: Affiliation of the State Leader (AFF) 
  Related Provinces Unrelated Provinces 
Jiang Zemin (1993-2003) 33.2% 25.5%*** 
Hu Jintao (2003-2013) 20.2% 17.1%*** 
 
Panel B: Origination of the Province Leader (ORIGIN) 
  Central Government Other Provinces Local Province 
Governor 26.5% 19.0%*** 20.1%*** 
Party Secretary 19.2% 22.1%** 20.5%** 
 
Panel C: Politburo (BURO) 
  Yes No 
If provincial party secretary and/or governor became 
politburo member 
28.0% 18.9%*** 
 
Panel D: Political Pluralism (PLU)    
 Low High 
Provincial Political Pluralism  19.5% 21.4%*** 
 
 
Table 4: Political Connection and Speed of Adjustment  
This table shows calculated SOA(𝝺) under various factors of political connections/risk. Panel A uses state ownership 
(STATE) as the proxy for political connection. Panel B uses CPC member/appointment (CPC_MEMBER) as the 
proxy for political connection. Panel C uses political exposure (EXPOSURE) as the proxy for political risk. Chi-
squared test is conducted for the statistical inference of the 𝝺 across subsamples. *, **, and *** denote significance 
at 5%, 1%, and 0.1% level, respectively. Variables construction is detailed in appendix A. 
 
Panel A: State Ownership (STATE)   
 Low High 
State Ownership 19.20% 21.40%*** 
 
Panel B: CPC Member/Appointment (CPC_MEMBER)   
 Low High 
CPC Member/Appointment 16.60% 17.90%*** 
 
Panel C: Political Exposure (EXPOSURE) 
  High Median Low 
Political Exposure (Two Groups) 16.9%  21.7%*** 
Political Exposure (Three Groups) 17.3% 19.0%*** 25.8%*** 
 
Table 5: Time-Variant Speed of Adjustment  
This table shows the results of equation (8), which investigates the impact of time-variant political factors on the time-variant SOA(𝝺) measures. The dependent variable is the 
change in leverage from the previous period. The independent variables are the interaction terms between the political factors and the deviation from the optimal leverage 
ratio, 𝐷𝐿𝐸?̂?. All the political factors are standardized first and multiplied by 𝐷𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑗,𝑡̂ , to ease interpretation of the results. The firm fixed effect is control. *, **, and *** 
denote significance at 5%, 1%, and 0.1% level, respectively. Variables construction is detailed in appendix A.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Variable DLEV DLEV DLEV DLEV DLEV DLEV DLEV DLEV DLEV 
                    
Political Uncertainty Index  𝐷𝐿𝐸?̂? -0.049***     -0.028*** -0.050*** -0.032*** -0.027*** 
 (0.001)     (0.004) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) 
Political Pluralism (PLU)  𝐷𝐿𝐸?̂?  -0.050***    -0.023***  -0.025*** -0.032*** 
  (0.001)    (0.004)  (0.004) (0.005) 
Origination of the Leader (ORIGIN)  𝐷𝐿𝐸?̂?   -0.034***     0.006*** 0.005*** 
   (0.001)     (0.002) (0.002) 
Political Exposure (EXPOSURE)  𝐷𝐿𝐸?̂?    -0.014***   -0.002** -0.002* -0.002* 
    (0.001)   (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
State Ownership (STATE)  𝐷𝐿𝐸?̂?     -0.010***    0.006*** 
     (0.001)    (0.001) 
Constant 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
          
Observations 24,708 24,708 24,304 23,731 24,708 24,708 23,731 23,731 23,731 
R-squared 0.181 0.180 0.115 0.066 0.049 0.184 0.191 0.194 0.196 
Adj. R-squared 0.083 0.081 0.006 -0.051 -0.065 0.086 0.089 0.092 0.094 
  
Table 6: Interaction of Political Environment and Political Connection/Risk  
This table shows SOA(𝝺) under the interaction of political environment and political connection. The first half of 
the table shows SOA under the interaction of PLU and EXPOSURE. The second half of the table shows SOA under 
the interaction of BURO and EXPOSURE. Chi-squared test is conducted for the statistical inference of the 𝝺 across 
subsamples. *, **, and *** denote significance at 5%, 1%, and 0.1% level, respectively. Variables construction is 
detailed in appendix A.  
    Overall Exposure (H) Exposure (L) 
Political Pluralism (PLU) Low 19.5% 20.0% 22.2%** 
  High 21.4%*** 16.8%*** 26.9%*** 
 
    Overall Exposure (H) Exposure (L) 
Politburo (BURO) No 18.9% 18.8% 21.9%** 
  Yes 28.0%*** 20.1%*** 42.6%*** 
 
 
Table 7: Exogenous Shock with Emigrant Policy  
This table shows the two-stage least squares (2SLS) results using provincial-level emigrant policy change as an 
exogenous shock. The instrumental variable is the status of emigrant policy. We omit the first-stage results to conserve 
space. The second-stage model follows equation (8), which investigates the impact of time-variant political factors on 
time-variant SOA(𝝺) measures. The dependent variable is the change in leverage from the previous period. The 
independent variables are the interaction terms between the political factors and the deviation from the optimal 
leverage ratio, 𝐷𝐿𝐸?̂?. All the political factors are standardized first and multiplied by 𝐷𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑗,𝑡̂ , to ease interpretation 
of the results. The firm fixed effect is controlled. 
The table also contains statistical tests of weak identification, overidentification, and underidentification for the use 
of instrument variables. The values in parentheses are the standard errors. *, **, and *** denote significance at 5%, 
1%, and 0.1% level, respectively. The way we construct the variables is detailed in appendix A. 
  (1) (2) 
Variable DLEV DLEV 
      
Political Pluralism (PLU)  𝐷𝐿𝐸?̂? -0.020***  
 (0.001)  
Political Exposure (EXPOSURE)  𝐷𝐿𝐸?̂?  -0.046*** 
  (0.002) 
Constant 0.004*** 0.004*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
   
Observations 24,708 23,731 
Adj. R-squared 0.051 -0.145 
   
Underidentification Test (Anderson LM statistic) 8841 1984 
P-value (0.000) (0.000) 
Weak-Identification Test (Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic)   543,382 1,369 
Stock-Yogo Weak ID Test Critical Values 19.93 19.93 
Sargan Statistic (Overidentification Test) 180.0 27.26 
P-value (0.000) (0.000) 
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Table 8: Significant Change in Political Position, Financial Constraint, and Market Financing Condition  
Panel A reports the univariate tests using time-variant SOA for firms that experience significant changes in their political positions. 
Panel B reports the political impact on the speed of adjustment with the time-variant measurements for firms with high and low levels 
of financial constraint and for a subsample period with monetary tightening and monetary easing policy. We use z-score as a measure 
of financial constraint and use the reserve requirement ratio (RRR) set by the People’s Bank of China for the easiness of monetary 
policy. The dependent variable is the change in leverage from the previous period. The independent variables are the interaction 
terms between the political factors and the deviation from the optimal leverage ratio, 𝐷𝐿𝐸?̂?. All the political factors are standardized 
first and multiplied by 𝐷𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑗,𝑡̂ , to ease interpretation of the results. The firm fixed effect is controlled. Columns (3) presents the 
Chi-squared test for the comparison of the coefficients between high and low financially constraint firms, and column (6) presents 
the Chi-squared test for the comparison of the coefficients between monetary tightening and easing periods.  *, **, and *** denote 
significance at 5%, 1%, and 0.1% level, respectively. Variables constructions is detailed in appendix A. 
 
Panel A: Significant Change in Political Position and Speed of Adjustment  
 (1) (2) (3) 
 SOA(t-1) SOA(t) Diff (2)-(1) 
State Ownership (STATE)    
Increase from below 50% to over 50% 16.71% 20.47% 3.75%* 
Decrease from above 50% to below 50% 19.41% 13.59% -5.82%** 
    
CCP Member/Appointment (CCP_MEMBER)    
Gained Top Executives with CCP Member 17.93% 19.37% 1.44%* 
Lost Top Executives with CCP Member 18.09% 16.92% -1.17%* 
    
Political Exposure (EXPOSURE)    
50% Decrease in Political Exposure 16.07% 18.95% 2.88%*** 
50% Increase in Political Exposure 20.10% 17.41% -2.69%*** 
 
Panel B: Financial Constraint and Market Financing Condition 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES 
High 
Financial 
Constraint 
Low 
Financial 
Constraint 
Chi-
squared 
test 
(2)-(1) 
Monetary 
Tightening 
Monetary 
Easing 
Chi-
squared 
test  
(5)-(4) 
       
Political Uncertainty Index  𝐷𝐿𝐸?̂? -0.059*** -0.018*** 14.93*** -0.081*** -0.011 11.23*** 
 (0.010) (0.007) (0.000) (0.015) (0.013) (0.000) 
Political Pluralism (PLU)  𝐷𝐿𝐸?̂? -0.044*** -0.015*** 6.82** -0.109*** -0.008 9.63** 
 (0.014) (0.002) (0.009) (0.016) (0.016) (0.002) 
Origination of the Leader (ORIGIN)  𝐷𝐿𝐸?̂? -0.003*** 0.009*** 9.34** -0.007*** 0.008*** 7.42** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.006) 
Political Exposure (EXPOSURE)  𝐷𝐿𝐸?̂? -0.003** -0.001*** 1.93 -0.005*** 0.001 6.48* 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.165) (0.001) (0.006) (0.011) 
State Ownership (STATE)  𝐷𝐿𝐸?̂? 0.006** -0.004** 8.12** 0.008** -0.003*** 4.72* 
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.004) (0.003) (0.000) (0.030) 
Constant -0.030*** 0.028***  -0.004*** 0.012***  
 (0.001) (0.001)  (0.000) (0.001)  
       
Observations 10,263 11,521  10,660 11,124  
Adj. R-squared 0.235 0.147  0.156 0.222  
 
